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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we will present how to find keys elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) with 
simple tools of Delphi 7 console application, using the software problem solving of the 
scalar point multiplication in the field GF (p), where p is an arbitrary prime number. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since our permanent goal is to have more of our own software [1], we have 
decided to present in this paper the software implementation of the scalar 
point multiplication in a finite field Fp [2]. Besides this basic motive, there 
is one more which seems to be more important – the actual prioritizing ECC 
over RSA. If we compare ECC to RSA, we can conclude that ECC is faster, 
safer and requires significantly less resources (ranging from energetic 
resources, up to hardware). So, ECC becomes a better alternative when it 
comes to authentication of different mobile devices, in sensor networks, and 
wherever there is a need (for a variety of reasons) to avoid the “raw” and 
endless increasing of the number of bits, as it is the case in RSA [3], [4]. 
There is one more reason why we have opted for this work: despite the fact 
that mathematical bases of ECC and RSA are completely different, they are 
solved using the same instruments, i.e. tools we have developed [5]. The set 
of tools necessary for the formation of a private key in ECC is a real subset 
of tools needed for the solving of the same problem in RSA. 
Of course, we cannot ignore the fact ( in our intention to introduce a scalar 
point multiplication) that both leading schemes of digital signature (ECC 
and RSA) are brilliant examples of the application of the theory of finite 
fields [6 - 9], where ECC [10-17] is still based on the richness of algebraic 
features of elliptic curves , while RSA is based on the assumption of 
difficult factoring of large numbers whose only factors are two large 
(probably) prime numbers. 
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2. TASK AND AIM 
In this paper we do not intend to deal with the theory of elliptic curves, 
because there is a lot of good work on that [2],[8], [18-19]. We are 
interested in the results of the theory that we wish to encode. 
Our goal is to calculate k*P=Q, where P and Q are points (set E) on an 
eliptic curve: y
2
= x
3
 +ax +b. Operation „*‟ denotes the series of Point 
doubling and Point adding.  
2.1 Point adding 
For given two points P(xp,yp), Q(xq,yq)  (P≠±Q)  in the set E, the group 
operator will allow us to calculate a third point R(xr,yr), also in the set E, 
such that P + Q = R. 
Not difficult to find the coordinates of point R: xr = s
2 –xp - xq  where s
2
 =2xp  
+ xq +xr – xp   
As point R belongs to the straight line (PQ) then s= 
yr−yp
xr−xp
  and we find: yr = 
yp +s(xr –xp) 
2.2 Point doubling 
For given point P(xp,yp) in the set E, the group operator will allow us to 
calculate a third point R(xr,yr), also in the set E, such that P + P = 2P= R. 
xr = s2 -2xp where s= 
3xp
2−a
2yp
   and  yr= yp +s (xr – xp) 
2.3 Point multiplication 
One of the most important operations for all applications of elliptic curves is 
scalar multiplication. Scalar multiplication consists of computing the value 
of a large integer multiplied by a point by doing a series of point doublings 
and additions until the product point is reached. In this paper we will use 
approach for computing k*P was introduced by Montgomery [20]. 
Algorithm: Binary method 
INPUT: An integer k>0 and a point P. 
OUTPUT: Q=k*P 
1. Set k(kl-1…k1k0)2 
2. Set P1P, P2=2P. 
3. for I from l-2 downto 0 do 
   If ki=1 then 
      Set P1P1 +P2, P22P. 
    Else 
       Set P2P2+P1, P12P1. 
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4. RETURN  (Q=P1) 
3. CONSOLE APPLICATION DELPHI 7 
In this paragraph, we will encode the algorithm above by a simple tool, and 
that is the Console Application Delfi 7 (see Appendix). Our goal is not to 
develop the program that is characterized by faultless performance; our goal 
is to show that this program does its task (point multiplication) and that it is 
possible to solve such a serious task in a simple way which is good for 
learning and entering the problem, the way that breaks the concern about the 
cryptic of cryptography itself. This way can assure us that applied 
cryptography is not as difficult as it seems to be. This program is a really 
good base for those who want to optimize and develop their own tool that 
won‟t be just illustrative, but it will be able to serve, considering the fact 
that we work with arbitrarily large numbers for which it is only necessary to 
set the initial constant in the Unit [21-22]. 
3.1 Example  (Outputs) 
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) recommended ten 
finite fields [2]. We will observe the prime finite field Fp for  p=2
192
 – 264 -1  
For curve P-192 a= - 3 and base point:  
P(XG, YG): 
XG = 0x 188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a118800f4ff0afd82ff1012 
YG=  0x 07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd53f977a11e794811 
Let k= 
1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000
00000000000000000000000000010001101011 
(probably) prime large (160 bit) number. ( k[159]=1, k[100]=1, 
k[50]=1,k[10]:=1; k[6]:=1; k[5]:=1;  k[3]=1, k[1]=1, k[0]=1). This number 
is not random “good” for cryptography, but was taken to illustrate the 
example. 
Coordinates of the point Q(X, Y) =k* P(XG, YG) are : 
X: 0x a9355c37074c8195faa23d1d071997fe4ea7a2bdec781047 
Y:0x 911a232aabeba33b5e8f29743f2837955cd5bf1f74aa9a24 
 
4. ECDSA KEY PAIR 
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [2] is the elliptic 
curve analogue of DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) [22].  
Security of DSA based on the computational intractability of the discrete 
logarithm problem (DLP) [23]. 
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The mathematical basis for the security of elliptic curve cryptosystems 
(ECC) is the computational intractability of the elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem (ECDLP) [24-25]. 
To put it simply: It is dificult to find a point P and integer k, given their 
product k*P. 
4.1 ECC parameters 
1. Public key is Q. 
2.Private key is k: (we choose) 
1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000
00000000000000000000000000010001101011 
3. Modulus: 
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
1111101111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
111111111) 
Which we generate the key pair for ECDSA. 
4.2 RSA parameters - comparison 
Elliptic curve cryptography can provide the same level and type security as 
RSA but with much shorter keys. More precisely, ECC takes one-sixth 
computational effort to provide the same security that ones get with 1024-
bit RSA, what no comments confirmed the following example: 
1024 -bit RSA parameters 
1. Public key pair (n,e) 
e:111 (we choose) 
n: (we count) 
1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000010000000000000000000000000010000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000
0000000000001101001000010000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000100000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000
0000000000000000000000011010010000010000000000000000000000000
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1000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000001000000000
0000000000000000010000000000011010010000000000000000000011010
0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000111100000110000
0000000000000000000000001010100010101001010111 
2. Private key d: (we count) 
1001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001
0010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010
0100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100
1001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001
0010010010100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100100
1001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001001
0010010010010010100100100100100100100100100110110110110110110
1101101101101101101101101101101110010010010010010010010010010
0100100100110011100100001001001001001001001001001001001001001
0010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010
0100100100100100100100100100110110110110110110110110111001001
0010010010010010010010010010010010010010010010110110110110110
1101101101101101101101111100101101010010010010010010010010010
1001001001001001001001001001011011011011011011011100000000000
0000000000000000001001001001011000001000100100100100100110011
1001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100010010100100
10010010010010010010010011110010100010111111 
3. Modulus: (we count) 
1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000010000000000000000000000000010000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000
0000000000001101000111101000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000010000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000
0000000000000000000000001101000111101000000000000000000000000
0100000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000100000000
0000000000000000001000000000001101000111100000000000000001101
0001111000000000000000000000000000000000000000011110000010000
00000000000000000000000001010100001110100111000.) 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Our paper, as well as other ones, is on the edge of the idea that the best 
protection is by using our own tools. In order to achieve this, it is necessary 
to increase interest in cryptography [26], and, in our opinion, the best way to 
do that is to encode and test cryptographic algorithms. 
That is the main reason why we have opted for the simplest console 
application. We want to show that it is possible to solve such a significant 
task (the scalar point multiplication in a finite field Fp) in an almost 
elementary way, without any software-hardware tools. 
Thus, the problem becomes more comprehensible to a wider range of 
readers, and in a simple way it demonstrates that the applied cryptography is 
not as unavailable as it seems to be, or as it is presented. 
The false idea of mysterious and too complicated cryptography reduces 
interest, refuses and discourages young researchers at the very beginning of 
a work, and thus it significantly minimizes the chances for developing our 
own tools. Therefore, we become dependent on the software producers, for 
whom our secrets become absolutely available. And each country that 
intends to protect itself as much as possible must take into account that fact, 
so as to protect itself from those who protect our secrets from all the others, 
except from them themselves. 
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APPENDIX 
A. NIST recommended prime finite field Fp for  p=2
192
 – 264 -1  
program multiplikacija_nist; 
{$APPTYPE CONSOLE} 
uses 
 SysUtils, 
{ Unit2mult_200 in '..\..\..\Bin\Unit2mult_200.pas', } 
 multiplikacija_dalje in 'multiplikacija_dalje.pas'; 
label 1; 
var pxp,pyp,p1x,p1y,p2x,p2y,x2,y2,rez1,rez2:array [0..nn] of integer; 
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 var modu,a,b,k:array [0..nn] of integer; 
 i,j,s1,l,i1,s,p:integer; 
begin 
b[64]:=1; 
 a[0]:=1; 
 modu[192]:=1; oduzmi(modu,a,modu); 
{procedure oduzmi- subtraction} 
 oduzmi(modu,b,modu); 
 a[1]:=1; 
{XG – coordinates} 
 pxp[12]:=1; pxp[16]:=1; pxp[17]:=1; pxp[18]:=1; 
 pxp[19]:=1; pxp[20]:=1; pxp[21]:=1; pxp[22]:=1; 
 pxp[23]:=1; pxp[25]:=1; pxp[31]:=1; pxp[32]:=1; 
 pxp[34]:=1; pxp[35]:=1; pxp[36]:=1; pxp[37]:=1; 
 pxp[38]:=1; pxp[39]:=1; pxp[41]:=1; pxp[43]:=1; 
 pxp[48]:=1; pxp[49]:=1; pxp[50]:=1;pxp[51]:=1; 
 pxp[52]:=1; pxp[53]:=1; pxp[54]:=1; pxp[55]:=1; 
 pxp[58]:=1; pxp[60]:=1; pxp[61]:=1; pxp[62]:=1; 
 pxp[63]:=1; 
{YG – coordinates} 
 pyp[15]:=1; pyp[17]:=1; pyp[20]:=1; pyp[21]:=1; 
 pyp[22]:=1; pyp[23]:=1; pyp[26]:=1; pyp[27]:=1; 
 pyp[28]:=1; pyp[29]:=1; pyp[33]:=1; pyp[38]:=1; 
 pyp[40]:=1; pyp[41]:=1; pyp[42]:=1; pyp[43]:=1; 
 pyp[45]:=1; pyp[46]:=1; pyp[47]:=1; pyp[49]:=1; 
 pyp[52]:=1; pyp[53]:=1; pyp[54]:=1; pyp[55]:=1; 
 pyp[56]:=1; pyp[57]:=1; pyp[58]:=1; pyp[61]:=1; 
 pyp[63]:=1; pyp[65]:=1; pyp[67]:=1; 
{(probably) prime number k} 
k[159]:=1,k[100]:=1;k[50]:=1;k[10]:=1;k[6]:=1;k[5]:=1;k[3]:=1;k[1]:=1; 
k[0]:=1; 
 s1:=0; 
 for i:=0 to nn do 
 begin 
 p1x[i]:=pxp[i]; 
 p1y[i]:=pyp[i]; 
 end; 
{Point multiplication} 
duplope(pxp,pyp,a,modu,x2,y2); 
 for i:=0 to nn do 
 begin 
 p2x[i]:=x2[i]; 
 p2y[i]:=y2[i]; 
 end; 
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dokle(k,s1); 
for i:=s1-1 downto 0 do 
begin 
 if k[i]=1 then 
 begin 
 s:=1; 
 koji(p1x,p2x,s); 
 if (s=0) then 
 begin 
{procedure duplope- point doubling} 
 duplope(p2x,p2y,a,modu,p2x,p2y); 
 goto 1; 
 exit; 
 end; 
{procedure dverazne-point addition} 
 dverazne(p1x,p1y,p2x,p2y,modu,p1x,p1y); 
 duplope(p2x,p2y,a,modu,p2x,p2y); 
 end 
 else 
 begin 
 s:=1; 
 koji(p1x,p2x,s); 
 if (s=0) then 
begin 
 duplope(p1x,p1y,a,modu,p1x,p1y); 
 goto 1; 
 exit; 
 end; 
 dverazne(p2x,p2y,p1x,p1y,modu,p2x,p2y); 
 duplope(p1x,p1y,a,modu,p1x,p1y); 
 end; 
 end; 
{procedure pisi- bin to hex} 
 pisi(p1x); 
 writeln; 
 pisi(p1y); 
 readln; 
 1:  begin 
 if s=0 then 
 write(' Infiniti Point '); 
 end; end. 
Remark: Appropriate procedures are in [27] 
  
